It seems like so little changes in the Ukraine conflict, many commentators and writers just keep repeating themselves a thousand times in the last few years. That is not to say that reputable and trustworthy ones haven’t said things that were true, perhaps getting some predictions wrong in the process (it is never advisable to make precise predictions), but here is the other side of the factual coin.
Even with the very minor current Russian advances into the edges of new oblasts, the battle lines have changed very little in the last three years, even now, whether Russia occupies ten percent or the 20 percent of Ukraine it does presently. It changes little and makes little difference in the big picture. This really is the truth. You can check the maps and see. This may well change over time but it has not to this point, and the Russian advance continues at a relative crawl with not much change in tactics and operations, although momentum is clearly in their favor.
The Russians have developed some very large and impressive missiles and some excellent precision strike capabilities, no doubt about it, but their intelligence and reconnaissance assets leave something to be desired. This was proven true by the fact that a year ago they didn’t see the Kursk incursion coming and reacted very slowly, which was a truly massive intel and recon failing, although they managed to repel it completely in the end. But still…
From a military standpoint, I can’t resist addressing the Ukraine war yet again. Just as I did an in-depth, careful and meticulous study of Iran’s missile capabilities and warned that Israel was unprepared to face it, and I posted my findings in summary on my Facebook page before Israel’s sneak attack, and I was proved right. In the same way, I have recently, for my own personal inquisitiveness and satisfaction, done the same kind of thorough study of the current condition of the Ukraine conflict, with particular emphasis on the conditions of the line of contact and operations all along the eastern front.
I’m sorry, but the Ukrainians and their defenses are no ”roll over,” as some people, even those who I deeply respect, have claimed. Three and a half years into the conflict and Russia is still not really close to capturing Kharkov (Kharkiv), and is even further from Odessa. They are still far away from the Dnipro River, the river running all the way down along Ukraine’s central region, west of which sits Kiev (Kyiv). How the Russians expected the Ukrainians to just ”give up” the entire four oblasts in the east as a term for peace when they thus far had proven unable to yet take them entirely by force is beyond my understanding.
The *only* ”peace agreement” which can satisfy the regime in Ukraine would be the return of all Russian-held territories, including Crimea. Zelensky has stipulated as much many times. The European Union holds a similar position. So the only alternative for Russia is to continue and win the war on its own terms to satisfy its stated security goals, no more fake, failed Minsk agreements or phony ceasefires intended for Ukraine only to catch its breath and regroup and rearm to continue fighting.
Here is what I see is happening upon close examination: With the exception of Russia’s air superiority, there is very little difference in terms of how both sides conduct maneuver or use drones, an important element of military operations. The Russians are constantly looking for ”weak spots” in the Ukrainian front line or in their troop rotations to exploit and attack. They have often found success, pushing the Ukrainians back several kilometers at a time, but sometimes the Ukrainians conduct a tactical withdrawal and then set up a trap to ambush or other times they counterattack the Russians with varying success even after they were forced to lose ground. All of this impedes and greatly slows the forward momentum of the Russian advance, which is usually conducted in small unit formations and limited maneuvers.
If Russia was capable or really wanted to open up the war and make serious progress, they would need to break open a hole through the front-line in a big way in a central or northern sector of the front-line, at least a kilometer or two in diameter, and just flood in with 200,000 troops, followed by contingents waiting in reserve. They would overrun and disable and destroy the rest of the defenses all up and down the line, with reserve troops to mop up, and they would continue a rapid westward advance to Kharkov (Kharkiv), followed by Odessa.
Kharkov (Kharkiv) in Ukraine, historically a Russian city, is literally only about 20 km from the Russian southern border, yet the Russians have not been able to take it by now, even though they have made countless attempts. They have captured other key cities in the region like Izium, but not Kharkov.
We are told by sources more sympathetic to the Russian side that Ukrainian military casualties have been anywhere from 1 to 1.7 million dead. I know that the regular Ukrainian military was only about 350,000 just before the start of the War, so even with native reservists, foreign mercenaries, and forced conscription added, it’s hard to account for this astronomically high casualty number. I’m not saying it’s not true necessarily, I’m only saying it’s very difficult to explain. It’s very difficult to explain how, if it is true, the Ukrainian military hasn’t already completely crumbled and surrendered by this stage in the War. At one point the Ukrainian military was increased to as much as 2.2 million. But apparently, according to current numbers available on statista.com and corroborated elsewhere, the Ukrainian military is today down to 900,000 in number (active soldiers). This seems credible when we take into account hacked and leaked numbers from the Ukrainian General Staff’s database which add up to the 1.7 million dead.
I’ve talked about computerized modern warfare capabilities as have others like my friend Colonel Douglas Macgregor. This integrates various platforms and information-gathering assets to provide real-time battlefield awareness, allowing for swift and precise offensive actions by maneuver forces. The effectiveness of the entire system depends on the speed and accuracy of intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination, followed by the ability to deliver rapid, precise strikes. I am of course referring to the modern military capability that fuses intelligence gathering and surveillance (ISR) with precision strike capabilities to identify, target, and neutralize enemy forces or opportunities.
Frankly, the Russians’ intelligence, reconnaissance, strike capabilities are not as sophisticated as we thought in the beginning. If they had been, the Russians would definitely have integrated this system more effectively and pushed further west by now, guaranteed. They only seem capable of launching bombs, sometimes with great accuracy, but with somewhat limited integration of ISR assets. They’ve wasted another summer with no major offensive and are no closer to their stated goals, further emboldening Zelensky in his weekly video addresses and further emboldening NATO and the US to oppose them and keep fighting rather than Russia striking a big victorious blow to force the West to make Zelensky capitulate at long last. Russia must understand that the longer it draws this out, the greater the risk for eventual nuclear confrontation of some kind.
The ”deep state” which is pushing this war has no morals or scruples, they only react with force and they only understand force in return. If Russia wants to win and end this on the battlefield, Russia needs to finally show them their full military capability in action on the conventional warfare level in Ukraine to make them see the game is up and make them back off and accept a permanent peace agreement which resolves, as Russia puts it, ”the root cause of the conflict,” which includes civil rights and independence for Russians in Luhansk and Donetsk.
It isn’t only the EU which is hurting economically from this war. Even Russia is now starting to feel the hurt with its GDP decreasing in the last year from 4 percent to 1.5 percent. That’s still better than most of Europe which is at less than 1 percent and Germany which is in negative growth. But still, it’s not something that Russia can take lightly. A sense of urgency is kicking in.
The question is, will Russia eventually be pushed into a corner and feel itself existentially forced to act out in desperation? Or can Russia pick up its game and achieve all of its essential strategic and security goals on the battlefield and finally force the West to the table? If not, then we continue to be in for a long, rough and very unpredictable ride with no apparent end in sight. If Russia makes it to the Dnieper River up and down the line and then stops and is satisfied with it as a line of delineation, then they will still be faced with a very hostile western Ukraine and its ”peace-keeping” support. Likewise, if they are able to march all the way to the Polish border, they will then have a very hostile NATO most literally on their doorstep, a NATO which is sabre-rattling and ramping up military spending. But this is for another article and another day…
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